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Voluntary Affirmative Action in the Private Sector-
Are Seniority Overrides for Layoffs Permissible?
Despite the constitutional right to equal protection under the law1
and statutes prohibiting discrimination,2 racial discrimination persists
in schools, workplaces, and other institutions. 3 Recognizing that such
laws alone are inadequate to achieve equality,4 courts have upheld
race-conscious remedies5 as a legitimate and necessary means of
counteracting discrimination in education 6 and employment.
7
In the area of employment, courts have sanctioned the use of race-
conscious remedies in two circumstances. First, under title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act,8 a court may order employers to institute affirm-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868).
2. Federal statutes prohibiting discrimination include: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); Civil Rights Act of 1871,
ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); Civil Rights Act of
1870, ch. 114, 12 Stat. 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)).
3. See generally RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES (T. Pettigrew ed.
1975). In 1978, Justice Brennan noted: "In 1968 and again in 1971, for example, we were
forced to remind school boards of their obligation to eliminate racial discrimination root
and branch.' And a glance at our docket and at dockets of lower courts will show that even
today officially sanctioned discrimination is not a thing of the past." Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 (1978) (footnotes omitted) (Brennan, J., joined by White, J.,
Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4. See Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1064 (1981), in which the court stated:
Many obstacles to achieving equal employment opportunities remain. . . . The
Nation's early perception in the school segregation cases taught us these obstacles
are unlikely to be overcome merely by the prohibition of present and future dis-
crimination. As Justice Blackmun observed in Bakke, "In order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way."
Id. at 966. See also Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154, 1159
(S.D. Ill. 1971), afid, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972). See generally Wright, Color-Blind Theo-
ries and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 213 (1980).
5. A "race-conscious remedy" is a remedy that redresses past discrimination by taking
race into account. Such a remedy attempts to counteract rather than merely halt discrimina-
tion. The use of race-conscious remedies began with judicial efforts to enforce the prohibi-
tion against state imposed segregation in the public schools. See infra cases cited in note 6.
6. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), mod#Fed on
other grounds, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
7. See infra cases cited in note 10.
8. Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972 at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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ative action hiring and promotion programs9 upon proof of discrimina-
tory employment practices.' 0 Second, under United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 1 a private employer may voluntarily institute an
affirmative action hiring or promotion program if it is designed to elim-
inate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job cate-
Title VII prohibits discrimination by public and private employers with fifteen or more em-
ployees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). Specifically, section 703(a) of title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a). Section 703(d) of title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization,
or joint labor- mangement committee controlling apprenticeship or other training
or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission
to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other
training.
Id. § 2000e-2(d).
9. The term "affirmative action hiring or promotion program" is used in this Note to
describe a race-conscious remedy that requires the employer to either fill a certain percent-
age of vacancies with qualified minority applicants until minority employees are fairly rep-
resented in the employer's workforce, or to achieve a racially representative workforce
within a specific time period. Section 706(g) of title VII provides for affirmative action
remedies:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate which may include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay. . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) (emphasis added).
Courts have also held that affirmative action plans may be ordered to remedy violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Sester v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 966-67 (8th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981); Taylor v. Jones, 495 F. Supp. 1285, 1295 (E.D. Ark. 1980);
Blount v. Xerox Corp., 405 F. Supp. 849, 853 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
10. See United States v. Buffalo, 633 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1980); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n
of Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v.
Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); United States v. N.L.
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int'l
Union Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Carter v. Gal-
lagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Jones v. Milwaukee
County, 441 F. Supp. 455 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp.
1095 (D. Md. 1977); Nowlin v. Pruitt, 417 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Sherrill v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 410 F. Supp. 770 (W.D.N.C. 1975), a 'd without opinion, 551 F.2d 308 (4th
Cir. 1977).
11. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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gories and does not unnecessarily infringe the interests of white
employees. 12
Affirmative action hiring and promotion programs are intended to
provide minority workers the opportunity to enter or advance into posi-
tions traditionally closed to them. However, minority employees hired
under these programs generally have less seniority than white employ-
ees. Consequently, layoffs based solely on seniority are likely to dispro-
portionately affect minorities and undermine the affirmative action
hiring and promotion programs.' 3
While the Weber Court held that title VII's prohibition of employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of race does not bar all voluntary af-
firmative action programs in the private sector, 14 the Court declined to
draw a clear line between "permissible" and "impermissible" pro-
grams.' 5 It found only that the specific training program at issue in
Weber fell on the "permissible side of the line" based on certain fea-
tures it embodied.' 6 Thus, the Court did not address whether an af-
firmative action plan designed to protect minority employees during
layoffs from the disproportionate effects of the traditional "last hired,
first fired" seniority system would be permissible. Nor did the Court
indicate how section 703(h) of title VII, 17 which specifically protects
bona fide seniority systems as a lawful employment practice, would af-
fect such an analysis.
An extension of private voluntary affirmative action to layoffs
could affect a large percentage of the American workforce. The term
"voluntary" does not apply only to employers who engage in affirma-
tive action out of a sense of civic duty, but also includes any program
not ordered by a court, even if it was adopted under government pres-
12. Id. at 208-09 (discussed infra notes 62-78 & accompanying text).
13. See, e.g., Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 556-67 (6th Cir. 1981) (a 7% reduction in
the Toledo fire department budget led to the layoff of nearly half of the black and hispanic
firefighters hired since the entry of an affirmative action consent decree); Tangren v. Wack-
enhut Servs. Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539, 547 (D. Nev. 1979), aft'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982) (employer's "recruitment and placement programs were
essentially nullified when layoffs followed the last hired, first fired seniority system").
14. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. For cases considering voluntary affirmative action in the
public sector, see Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981); Detroit Police Officers'
Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
15. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
16. Id. at 208-09.
17. Section 703(h) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17],
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
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sure.18 Thus, a program instituted to comply with affirmative action
requirements for federal contractors is considered voluntary.' 9 Because
the federal government contracts or subcontracts with numerous em-
ployers, resolution of this issue may affect a substantial number of
workers.20
This Note discusses whether private employers may voluntarily
implement "seniority overrides" 2' to preserve the gains realized by af-
18. Under Executive Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Comp.), reprinted in
42 U.S.C. § 2000e at 1232-36 (1976), and its implementing regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 60-1 to -
4.9 (1983), employers contracting with the federal government (either as general contractors
or subcontractors) may be required to implement affirmative action programs if their
workforce is racially imbalanced. For a detailed discussion of Executive Order 11,246, see
Note, Voluntary Affirmative Action After United Steelworkers of America v. Weber. Con-
structing A Peaceful Coexistence Between Title VII and Executive Order 11,246, 27 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1159 (1980).
Under the Reagan Administration, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
grams in the Department of Labor has published proposed regulations that would substan-
tially weaken the application and enforcement of the Order and its implementing
regulations. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,979-43,017 (1981). If these proposed regulations are adopted,
only major federal contractors will be affected by the executive order. See Davis, Nullfying
Affirmative Action Through Deregulation, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 107 (1982); Silbergeld, New
Affirmative Action Regulations for Government Contractors, 33 LAB. L.J. 230 (1982).
19. The employers in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and
Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs. Inc., 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916
(1982), contracted with the federal government and were under considerable pressure to
implement affirmative action programs. Nevertheless, the programs were considered volun-
tary. Weber, 443 U.S. at 200; Tangren, 658 F.2d at 706-07. In Tangren, the district court
reasoned:
The fact that [the union] did not readily assent to the affirmative action provision
proposed by [the employer], even to the point of striking and of filing an unfair
labor practice complaint with the NLRB, does not distinguish this case. Such diffi-
culties and disagreements are an integral part of the collective bargaining process.
When one side or the other finally concedes one point in return for some other
benefit, including a resumption of work, the contract is no less "voluntary." To
find otherwise would severely impair the entire system for resolving labor-manage-
ment disputes.
Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs. Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539, 545 (D. Nev. 1979).
20. In 1980, the federal government contracted with a total of 350,000 employers em-
ploying nearly 40 million workers. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS AD-
MINISTRATION: THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 3 (Jan.
1981). Not all of these employers are affected by Exec. Order No. 11,246, as the current
threshold for triggering the Order's provisions is 50 or more employees and at least $50,000
in federal contracts. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1983).
21. The term "seniority override" is used in this Note to describe a type of affirmative
action plan in which layoffs of underrepresented minority employees are limited so that the
percentage of minority employees on the job remains constant. The following is an example
of a seniority override provision included in a collective bargaining agreement:
The parties agree to the following goals and objectives for the minimum employ-
ment of minority male employees and female employees in the bargaining unit:
July 1, 1978 to July 1, 1979 ...
18% Minorities, 5% Female
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firmative action hiring and promotion programs when layoffs threaten
to undermine those gains.22 The Note first examines whether seniority
overrides are prohibited by the special protection afforded seniority
systems under section 703(h) of title VII. 23 The Note then considers
July 1, 1979 to July 1, 1980...
19% Minorities, 6% Female
July 1, 1980 to July 1, 1981...
20% Minorities, 7% Female
The provisions [regarding layoffs] shall be suspended to the extent necessary to
guarantee that a minority or female employee covered by this Agreement shall not
be reduced in force if the goal and objective of 18% minorities and 5% females...
is either not achieved at the time of the reduction in force or, if achieved, did not
continue to be met in the event a minority or female employee was to be reduced in
force. In the event this action becomes necessary, the non-minority male with the
least amount of seniority will be laid off first.
Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs. Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539, 541 (D. Nev. 1979), aqj'd, 658 F.2d 705
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
22. The Supreme Court is presently considering the validity of a court-approved con-
sent decree ordering a public employer to use seniority overrides. Stotts v. Memphis Fire
Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983). In Stotts, as well as
in Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981), and Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher,
679 F.2d 965 (lst. Cir. 1982), vacatedfor consideration of mootness, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983),
the parties had settled previous litigation by agreeing that the employer would institute af-
firmative action hiring and promotion programs. The district judges later modified the set-
tlements, embodied in consent decrees, to provide for seniority overrides in light of
unforeseen budget cuts that threatened to impede fulfillment of the terms of the consent
decree. In all three cases the modification was upheld by the appellate court.
Although a consent decree reflects a voluntary settlement by the parties, these cases are
not applicable to the area of voluntary affirmative action since a consent decree, entered and
approved by the court, has the same force and effect as a court order entered after full
litigation. See, e.g., Hadsfield v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 427 F. Supp. 264 (S.D. Ala. 1977);
Clarke v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 74 (S.D. Iowa 1976); A.D. Julliard & Co. v.
Johnson, 166 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), q49'd, 259 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 942 (1958). Thus, these seniority overrides are considered court ordered, rather than
voluntary.
23. See supra note 17 & accompanying text. Constitutional constraints do not apply
because a program implemented solely by private parties does not involve state action. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In Weber, the Court noted that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment was not implicated because the plan did not involve state action.
Weber, 443 U.S. at 200. However, the employer, a federal contractor, initiated the affirma-
tive action program in response to pressure from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
(OFCC) to comply with its affirmative action requirements for federal contractors. Weber v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1977). One commentator has
argued that OFCC's role constituted state action and that affirmative action programs cre-
ated to comply with its regulations should be scrutinized in light of constitutional con-
straints. See Note, The Presence of State Action in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 1980 DuKE
L.J. 1172. Even if constitutional constraints were applicable, courts have held that such con-
straints do not preclude all voluntary affirmative action plans. See Bratton v. City of De-
troit, 704 F.2d 878, 883 (6th Cir. 1983); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 507-08 (8th Cir.
1981); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 691 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 938 (1981). Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a provision
of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 that required 10% of federal funds granted for
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whether seniority overrides can withstand scrutiny under the Weber
analysis of permissible voluntary affirmative action programs in the
private sector. It concludes that private sector seniority overrides are
both legal and essential to the success of affirmative action programs.
Section 703(h) of Title VII
The only provision in title VII concerning seniority is section
703(h). 24 The pertinent part provides that "it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system or merit system. ' '25
While this provision was clearly designed to protect seniority systems, 26
it is unsettled whether it prohibits seniority overrides. The two appel-
late courts that have reviewed seniority overrides have held that they
are permissible despite section 703(h),27 but the Supreme Court has yet
to pass on the issue.
On its face, section 703(h) states only that, absent discriminatory
intent, the operation of a bona fide seniority system does not violate
title VII.28 The section does not state that a modification of such a
system is unlawful. Thus, taken literally, the section does not prohibit
seniority overrides. Both the legislative history and judicial interpreta-
tions of section 703(h) suggest that such an interpretation of the statute
is appropriate.
Legislative History
Due to the absence of the customary legislative materials,29 the
Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
public works projects to be used by the grantee to procure services or supplies from minority
owned businesses).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
25. Id. See supra note 17.
26. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75 (1982) (" 'seniority systems
are afforded special treatment under Title VII itself ") (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977)).
27. Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs. Inc., 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 916 (1982); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 976 (1982). The Sisco court did not directly address the application of section
703(h) to seniority overrides.
28. See supra note 17.
29. Neither the initial House Bill, see H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), nor the
majority Judiciary Committee Report, see H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963),
addressed the issue of seniority. Several weeks after H.R. 7152 passed the House, a compro-
mise bill (known as the Mansfleld-Dirksen Bill) that included section 703(h) was introduced
on the Senate floor. 110 CONG. REc. 1192, 1193 (1964). The Mansfield-Dirksen Bill (and
hence § 703(h)) was not the subject of a committee report, the usual source of legislative
history. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 759-62 (1976). For a detailed
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States30 deduced the legislative intent underlying section 703(h) from
three memoranda. These three documents were introduced into the
Congressional Record by Senators Case and Clark during the Senate
debate on title VII.31 The Court labeled these memoranda "authorita-
tive indicators of [section 703(h)'s] purpose." 32
The first memorandum is a Justice Department statement that
reads in part:
Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time
it takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract pro-
vides that in the event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be
laid off first, such a provision would not be affected in the least by
Title VII. This would be true even in the case where owing to dis-
crimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had
more seniority than Negroes. . . . Any differences in treatment
based on established seniority rights would not be based on race and
would not be forbidden by the Title.33
The second memorandum consists of written answers by Senator Clark
to questions from Senator Dirksen.
Question. . . . Normally, labor contracts call for "last hired, first
fired." If the last hired are Negroes, is the employer discriminating if
his contract requires that they be first fired and the remaining em-
ployees are white?
Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under
a "last hired, first fired" agreement a Negro happens to be the "last
hired" he can still be "first fired" as long as it is done because of his
status as "last hired" and not because of his race.34
These memoranda only state that a seniority system is not illegal under
title VII even if minority employees are disproportionately affected by
layoffs due to their lesser seniority. The documents simply explain
what the provision literally sets forth; they do not suggest that section
703(h) should be construed as implicitly forbidding seniority overrides,
and in fact have no apparent bearing on seniority overrides at all.
The third memorandum, prepared by Senators Clark and Case, is
more problematic:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights ...
Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in the past
discussion of the legislative history of title VII, see Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 431 (1966).
30. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
31. See infra notes 33-35. Senators Clark and Case were the "bipartisan captains" re-
sponsible for title VII during the Senate debate. Such captains, selected for each title by
leading proponents of the Act from both parties, were charged with explaining and defend-
ing their title during the Senate debate. 110 CONG. Rac. 6528 (1964). See Vaas, supra note
29, at 444-45.
32. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977).
33. 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964).
34. Id. at 7217.
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and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes
into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future
vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-
or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to
prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to
give them special seniority rights at the expense of the while workers
hired earlier.35
This memorandum explicitly states that an employer would not be per-
mitted to interfere with seniority expectations and thus suggests that
seniority overrides are prohibited by section 703(h).
The authority of this third memorandum, however, is subject to
question. First, in approving the use of affirmative action promotion
programs and retroactive seniority remedies, courts have acknowl-
edged, explicitly or implicitly, that some interference with the seniority
expectations of white employees is permissible.36 Second, the memo-
randum states that employers would be prohibited from using any af-
firmative hiring remedies.37 Yet this has not deterred the courts from
repeatedly approving affirmative action hiring and promotion pro-
grams.38 Such subsequent judicial action casts doubt on the authority
of the document. It is also likely that this memorandum was designed
to quell fears that the enactment of title VII would destroy the seniority
system. Justice Brennan has suggested that the bill's proponents, in
their eagerness to pass the bill, indulged in some exaggeration.39
Moreover, had Congress intended to provide broader immunity for
seniority systems than that literally granted by section 703(h), it could
35. Id. at 7213 (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. McCall
Printing Corp., 633 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir. 1980).
The fact that the former carloaders were adversely affected by the grant of retroac-
tive seniority to the female employees ... does not constitute an act of discrimina-
tion towards them .... In such a case, retroactive seniority is an appropriate
remedy .... Unfortunately, wherever one employee is given increased seniority
rights, the acquisition of such rights often conflicts with the economic interests of
other employees .... This unfortunate consequence does not preclude concilia-
tion agreements or consent decrees granting relief designed to correct the wrongs to
which Title VII is directed.
Id. at 1237 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 773-79 (1976)).
37. 110 CONG. Rac. 7213 (1964).
38. See supra cases cited in notes 10-1 I.
39. Justice Brennan stated in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson:
The defenders of Title VII responded in strong terms to the charge that "[T]itle VII
would undermine the vested rights of seniority.". . . According to the Act's propo-
nents, this charge was a "cruel hoax . . . generat[ing] unwarranted fear among
those individuals who must rely upon their job or union membership to maintain
their existence." . . . Thus, with some exaggeration, the proponents of Title VII
suggested that Title VII would not affect employees' expectations that arose from
the operation of seniority systems.
456 U.S. 63, 82 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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have explicitly done so in the original bill or in the 1972 amendments.
Instead, the 1972 amendments enlarged the remedial powers of the
courts "to give [them] wide discretion in exercising their equitable pow-
ers to fashion the most complete relief possible."'40
In sum, with the exception of a single memorandum that has al-
ready been partially discounted by the courts, the legislative history of
section 703(h) supports a literal interpretation of that section and does
not appear to bar seniority overrides.
Judicial Interpretations
The Supreme Court's interpretations of section 703(h) are consis-
tent with a literal reading of the section. In Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Company,4' the Court held that section 703(h) did not bar the
award of retroactive seniority to job applicants who had been refused
employment because of their race.42 Retroactive seniority was deemed
appropriate even though it would negatively affect the seniority inter-
ests of current employees.43 The Court labeled section 703(h) "defini-
tional," noting that, "as with other provisions of § 703, subsection (h)
delineates which employment practices are illegal and thereby prohib-
ited and which are not."44 Section 703(h), the Court added, "certainly
does not expressly purport to qualify or proscribe relief otherwise ap-
propriate under the remedial provisions of Title VII, § 706 (g), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), in circumstances where an illegal discriminatory
act or practice is found. '45 Moreover, the Court found "no indication
in the legislative materials that § 703(h) was intended to modify or re-
strict relief otherwise appropriate once an illegal discriminatory prac-
tice occurring after the effective date of the Act is proved.' '4 6 This
interpretation of section 703(h) limits the section's impact to its literal
meaning.
The facts of Franks are distinguishable from those of a voluntary
program. The plaintiff in Franks had proven illegal discrimination and
had thus established a violation of title VII,47 giving rise to a court-
imposed remedy under section 706(g). In contrast, a voluntary affirma-
tive action program, such as a seniority override, may be instituted ab-
40. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976) (quoting 118 CONG. REC.
7168 (1972)).
41. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
42. Id. at 762-69.
43. Id. at 757-62.
44. Id. at 758. The Court again referred to § 703(h) as "definitional" in American
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 69 (1982).
45. Franks, 424 U.S. at 758-59, 761-62 (footnotes and citations omitted).
46. Id. at 758.
47. Id. at 750.
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sent proof of a title VII violation.48 However, the Court's narrow
reading of section 703(h) in Franks did not depend on its finding of
illegal discrimination. By characterizing section 703(h) as "defini-
tional" the Court acknowledged that its only effect is to exclude certain
employer conduct from the definition of unlawful employment prac-
tices, and therefore cannot serve to restrict the use of otherwise proper
affirmative action remedies under section 706(g). 49 Logically, the
Court's reasoning could extend to any appropriate remedial measure,
including one undertaken voluntarily. Under the interpretation of the
Franks Court, then, section 703(h) should pose no barrier to the volun-
tary adoption of seniority overrides.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,50 de-
cided by the Court one year after Franks, the government argued that
the routine operation of a seniority system adopted before 1964 vio-
lated title VII.51 The United States alleged that minority employees
who had been discriminatorily hired for lower paying positions were
deterred from transferring into better paying jobs because the seniority
system required forfeiture of accumulated seniority upon transfer.5 2
Hence, the operation of the seniority system had an adverse impact on
minority employees by locking in the effects of prior discriminatory
hiring practices. 53
The Teamsters Court conceded that the seniority system violated
title VII since it "'operate[d] to "freeze" the status quo of prior dis-
criminatory practices.' ,,54 The Court concluded, however, that section
48. Unlike court-ordered remedies that require proof of illegal discrimination, volun-
tary affirmative action programs in the private sector may be instituted to make traditionally
segregated job categories available to minority workers, even absent proof of illegal discrim-
ination. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979).
49. See supra note 9 & accompanying text. The Court did state that there is no restric-
tion on otherwise appropriate relief "once an illegal discriminatory practice. . . is proved."
Franks, 424 U.S. at 761-62 (emphasis added). Thus before a court may order a remedy
under title VII it must find illegal discrimination. This language does not suggest that such a
finding is required for the institution of a voluntary seniority override program.
50. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
51. Id. at 328.
52. Id. at 329-30, 344.
53. Id. at 344.
54. Id. at 349-50 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)). In
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court had held that facially neutral employment practices
that have a discriminatory effect on minorities violate title VII. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). In
Griggs, black employees argued that the employer violated title VII by requiring applicants
to pass an aptitude test or have a high school diploma. Id. at 425-26. The Court held that
although the practice was fair in form, its effect was discriminatory because the practice
favored white employees and there was no showing that the requirements were job related.
Id. at 429-30. Thus, under the Griggs standard, racially neutral employment practices
which are not job-related constitute illegal discrimination "if they operate to 'freeze' the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430.
[Vol. 35
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703(h) created an exception to this general rule by protecting the opera-
tion of a bona fide55 seniority system.5 6 Indeed, the "unmistakable pur-
pose of § 703(h) was to make clear that the routine application of a
bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title VII. ' 57
The Court thus reaffirmed the literal interpretation of section 703(h)
and gave no indication that the provision has any broader meaning or
would prohibit employers from voluntarily modifying a seniority plan
for remedial purposes.-5
Neither Franks nor Teamsters broadened the scope of section
703(h) beyond its literal meaning, and such a judicial expansion would
be inappropriate. In the one instance in which the Court departed
from a literal reading of a title VII provision,59 it justified the departure
on the ground that it was necessary to effect the purposes of the Act.60
In contrast, an interpretation of section 703(h) prohibiting seniority
overrides could not be similarly justified because limiting voluntary re-
medial efforts would frustrate, rather than further, the goals of title
VII.61
Assuming that section 703(h) of title VII does not bar seniority
55. Based on the legislative history discussed supra notes 33-37 & accompanying text,
the Court broadly construed "bona fide" to encompass any seniority system unless it was
created with the intention to discriminate or had its genesis in racial discrimination. Team-
sters, 431 U.S. at 353-54.
56. Id. at 354-55. "Accordingly, we hold that an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority
system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act
discrimination." Id. at 353-54.
57. Id. at 352.
58. It has been argued that seniority overrides interfere with the operation of a senior-
ity system and thus undermine the protective purpose of 703(h) as described by the Team-
sters Court. See Schatzki, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber. An Exercise in
Understandable Indecision, 56 WASH. L. Rav. 51, 72 (1980). While seniority overrides may
interfere with seniority expectations, § 703(h) only serves to protect bona fide seniority sys-
tems from a facial attack. No such attack is made by the use of a remedy affecting seniority
expectations. See Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 543 (5th Cir. 1980)
("post-Act discriminatees may receive complete retroactive seniority 'without attacking the
legality of the seniority system as applied to them' ") (quoting International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 347 (1977) (emphasis added)). And as noted above, the
Court has never suggested that 703(h) prevents employers from voluntarily establishing an
alternative system that gives preference to minorities during layoffs. In Tangren v. Wacken-
hut Servs. Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979), aft'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982), the district court held that section 703(h) should not constrain
voluntary seniority overrides. Id at 548. The court emphasized that because section 703(h)
is an exception to the general Griggs doctrine it should be narrowly construed and "limited
to the express language of the statute. It should not be read so as to preclude implementa-
tion of a program that goes beyond the requirements of Title VII." Id. See Tangren v.
Wackenhut Servs. Inc., 658 F.2d 705, 707 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981).
59. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-08 (1979); see also
infra note 69.
60. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201-02.
61. See infra notes 121-31 & accompanying text.
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overrides, the next question is whether a seniority override, as a form of
affirmative action, can satisfy the guidelines outlined in Weber for de-
termining whether a voluntary affirmative action program in the pri-
vate sector is permissible.
The Weber Decision
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber62 the Supreme Court
upheld a voluntary affirmative action training and promotion program
in the private sector. The employer, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Corporation (Kaiser), and the employees' union agreed to institute an
in-plant craft training program. 63 Fifty percent of the openings in the
program were to be allotted to black employees until the percentage of
Kaiser's black craftworkers reflected the percentage of blacks in the lo-
cal labor force.64 At the time the program began, less than two percent
of the skilled craftworkers at the plant were black although blacks rep-
resented approximately thirty-nine percent of the local workforce. 65
Except for the fifty percent proviso, the program openings were filled
strictly on the basis of seniority. 66 When Brian Weber and other white
employees were denied access to the training program despite their sen-
iority over the black admittees, Weber filed a class action suit alleging
that the program violated title VII's prohibition of racial
62. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). For additional commentary on the Weber decision, see
Neuborne, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 546 (1979); Note, Abrogation of the
Principle of Non-discrimiation--The Advent of Voluntary, Race-Dependent. Preferential
Treatment in Employment, 40 LA. L. REV. 1061 (1980); Note, Employer and Employee-
Employment Discrimination--Voluntary Affirmative Action Programs Not Prohibited by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979), 10
SETON HALL L. REv. 658 (1980).
63. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-98. In Weber, the union had agreed to the affirmative ac-
tion training program. Id. at 197. However, the Court did not specifically address whether
the union's consent was necessary to its holding or whether private employers could unilat-
erally implement an affirmative action plan. Other Supreme Court cases, however, have
emphasized the important policy interest in collective bargaining. In American Tobacco Co.
v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982), the Court underscored the importance of the collective
bargaining process and seniority provisions in particular. Id. at 76. See also Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977); Southbridge Plastics Div. v. Local 759, 565
F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1978) (union contract seniority provisions cannot be abrogated by the
employer absent evidence of discriminatory intent in the union agreement); Boyd, Affirma-
tive Action in Employment-The Weber Decision, 66 IowA L. REv. 1, 38 (1980).
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit, in Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146 (8th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982), allowed an employer to unilaterally modify
collectively bargained seniority provisions. The court held that the layoff of a white worker
against established seniority rules was permissible so long as the employer's affirmative ac-
tion plan satisfied the Weber guidelines. Id. at 149.
64. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198-99.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 199.
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discrimination.67
The Court responded that Congress enacted title VII to counteract
longstanding employment discrimination against minorities and to
open new job opportunities. 68 To use title VII to prohibit all voluntary
efforts to achieve this goal would be contrary to the Act's purpose.69
Although the Court declined to "detail the line of demarcation between
permissible and impermissible plans,"70 it indicated that the Kaiser
program was permissible because of two features: 1) the program Mir-
rored the purposes of title VII, and 2) it did not "unnecessarily tram-
mel" the interests of white employees.7 1
The Court found that the Kaiser program mirrored the purposes
of title VII because it was designed to break down old patterns of racial
segregation and open job opportunities in areas traditionally closed to
blacks.72 At the time the Kaiser plan was created, only five out of the
273 skilled craftworkers at the plant were black.73 In addition, the
Court judicially noticed the historical exclusion of blacks from craft
professions.74 Thus the Kaiser program clearly opened job opportuni-
ties for minorities in a traditionally segregated field.
The Court found that the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of white employees because it did not require the discharge of
white workers and their replacement with new black hirees.75 Also, it
did not create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees
because fifty percent of the program's slots were allocated for whites.76
Moreover, the plan was temporary, ending as soon as the percentage of
black skilled craftworkers at the plant approximated the percentage of
blacks in the local labor force.77
The Weber Court did not state that any voluntary affirmative ac-
tion hiring and promotion program must possess these two features in
67. Id. at 199-200.
68. Id. at 202-04.
69. Id. at 201-07. The Court stated:
In this context respondent's reliance upon a literal construction of §§ 703(a) and
(d) . . . is misplaced. . . . The prohibition against racial discrimination in
§§ 703(a) and (d) of Title VII must therefore be read against the background of the
legislative history of Title VII and the historical context from which the Act arose.
Id. at 201 (citations omitted). The Court noted that "[iut would be ironic indeed if a law
triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice.. . constituted the first
legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." Id. at 204.
70. Id at 208.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 198.
74. Id. at 198 n.l.
75. Id. at 208.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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order to comply with title VII. Lower courts, however, have viewed
these features as "safe-harbor" guidelines,78 and it is unlikely that a
program possessing these features will be deemed to violate title VII's
prohibition against discrimination. Thus it is important to determine
whether seniority overrides fall within the Weber guidelines.
Application of the Weber Guidelines to Seniority Overrides
To the extent that the seniority expectations of white employees
were adversely affected by the Kaiser plan, it appears that seniority
interests were subordinated to the fulfillment of title VII objectives.
The Weber Court, however, only evaluated the effect of an affirmative
action training program on seniority expectations; it did not consider
whether a program could extend affirmative action to layoffs. Never-
thless, the Court left open the possibility that the same guidelines could
be used when evaluating other types of affirmative action programs.79
The Court's analysis in Weber logically can be applied to seniority
overrides. Although Weber involved new job opportunities rather than
layoffs, this distinction is not significant. When the number of jobs de-
creases, the decision allocating the remaining positions can have the
same impact on the proportion of minority employees as the decision
allocating new positions in times of prosperity. Even assuming that the
impact of a layoff on an employee is greater than the impact of a rejec-
tion on a job-seeker, the greater impact would simply be factored into
the Weber test.80
Two circuit courts of appeals have applied the Weber guidelines to
seniority overrides and have upheld the overrides against title VII chal-
lenges. In Tangren v. Wackenhut Services, Inc. ,81 an employer (WSI)
adopted a plan in order to comply with the affirmative action require-
ments for federal contractors.8 2 Because frequent layoffs rendered the
program ineffective, WSI insisted on including a seniority override dur-
ing the next union negotiations. The court upheld the override provi-
sion against a challenge by a white union member.83 The court
rejected the claim that the provision unnecessarily trammeled the inter-
78. See, e.g., Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1064 (1981); Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs. Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979),
a.f'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
79. The Court cautiously stated: "We need not today define in detail the line of demar-
cation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans. It suffices to hold
that the challenged Kaiser-USWA affirmative action plan falls on the permissible side of the
line." Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
80. See infra notes 111-12 & accompanying text.
81. 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979), a f'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 916 (1982).
82. See supra notes 18-19.
83. Tangren, 658 F.2d at 705-06.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
SENIORITY OVERRIDES
ests of white workers, reasoning that the program was "carefully con-
toured to accomplish its limited objective. . . . As such it is an
appropriate response to the problem inherent in a reverse seniority lay-
off system." 84
In Sisco v. JS. Alberid Construction Co. ,85 the employer (Alber-
ici) also adopted an affirmative action plan to comply with require-
ments for federal contractors. 86 Unlike Tangren, however, a seniority
override provision was never adopted by the union. When layoffs be-
came necessary, Alberici laid off Sisco, a white shop steward, instead of
a black ironworker.87 Although the black worker had more seniority
than Sisco, Sisco was entitled to be laid off last under the union con-
tract because his status as shop steward gave him "superseniority."88
Nonetheless, the court upheld Alberici's action after briefly noting that
blacks had historically been excluded from the ironworker's trade in St.
Louis, that Alberici's affirmative action program was temporary, and
that Sisco was not replaced by a new black worker. 89
Although on point, neither the Tangren nor the Sisco court pro-
vides an extensive analysis of Weber's application to seniority over-
rides. Thus, a fuller discussion of the application of the Weber
guidelines to voluntary seniority overrides in the private sector is
required.
The First Weber Guideline
The first Weber guideline is met if "[t]he purposes of the plan mir-
ror those of the statute." 90 The purposes of the statute are mirrored if
the plan is designed to "break down old patterns of racial segregation
and hierarchy" 9' or to "'open opportunites for [minorities] in occupa-
tions which have been traditionally closed to them.' "92 Since the Kai-
ser plan in Weber trained blacks in the historically segregated craft
field, it plainly mirrored the purposes of title VII.93
Once it is demonstrated that a traditionally segregated job cate-
84. Id. at 707. Although the circuit court did not address the first guideline, the district
court found that the override provision mirrored the purposes of title VII because "it was
adopted in order to break down a hierarchy that perpetuated the effects of past racial dis-
crimination, here the absence of, or only a minimal participation in, the WSI workforce."
Tangren, 480 F. Supp. at 546.
85. 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982).
86. Id. at 149.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 147-48.
89. Id. at 149.
90. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
93. Id. at 198 n.1, 208.
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gory exists,94 a voluntary seniority override clearly assists in achieving
title VII purposes because it helps prevent erosion of gains made by
minority employees in segregated fields. Thus, the employer's action in
Sisco satisfied this guideline because blacks were historically excluded
from the ironworkers trade in St. Louis.95
In addition to promoting the integration of segregated fields, sen-
iority overrides also help alleviate the relatively high unemployment
rate among minorities.96 The legislative history suggests that title VII
was addressed in part to this important concern. During the Senate
debate, Senator Clark characterized the high rate of black unemploy-
ment as "a social malaise and a social situation which we should not
tolerate."'97 Because seniority overrides secure the gains of affirmative
action hiring by alleviating the regressive effect of layoffs, and also mit-
igate the high rate of unemployment among minorities, they mirror the
purposes of title VII and satisfy the first Weber guideline.
The Second Weber Guideline
The Weber Court's finding that the Kaiser plan did not "unneces-
sarily trammel the interests of white employees" rested on the consider-
94. This can be established by showing a significant disparity between the percentage
of minorities employed and the percentage of minorities in the local workforce. See Weber,
443 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981). Courts have liberally interpreted the
requirement of "traditionally segregated job categories." For example, in Cohen v. Com-
munity College, 484 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1980), the court found this requirement met by a
"history of racial discrimination in the relevant occupation or profession at large" without a
specific showing of minority underrepresentation in the employer's particular workforce.
Id. at 434. Conversely, in Tangren the court held that it sufficed that minorities were tradi-
tionally excluded as security guards in the employer's workforce without further evidence
that the security guard field was a traditionally segregated job category on a regional or
national level. Tangren, 480 F. Supp. at 546. In Sisco, the court stated simply that "[t]here
was a history of exclusion of black workers from the iron workers' trade in St. Louis." Sisco,
655 F.2d at 149. One commentator has concluded that the requirement is so "ill-defined, it
is likely to cease having real importance." Vaughn, Employment Quotas-Discrimination or
AffirmativeAction?, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 552, 560 (1982).
95. Sisco, 655 F.2d at 149. The district court in Tangren did not discuss whether the
job category "guard" was traditionally segregated. Rather, it stated that since the percent-
age of minorities employed by WSI was small compared to the percentage of minorities in
the local workforce, the seniority override served to break down a hierarchy that perpetu-
ated the effects of past discrimination, and thus mirrored the purposes of title VII. Tangren,
480 F. Supp. at 546.
96. Members of minority groups suffer from a relatively high unemployment rate com-
pared to that of the population as a whole. In 1965, the unemployment rate for all men and
women was 4.0% and 5.5%, respectively. For minorities the figures were 7.4% for men and
9.2% for women. In June 1982, the unemployment rate for all men was 9.7% and 9.1% for
women. For minorities the figures were 18.2% for men and 16.0% for women. U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 1982-1983 at 376 (1983).
97. 110 CONG. REC. 7220 (1964). See also Weber, 443 U.S. at 202.
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ation of three factors: 1) the Kaiser plan did not absolutely bar white
advancement, 2) it did not require the discharge and replacement of
whites with new black employees, and 3) it was temporary.98
First, the Court noted that under the Kaiser plan white employees
would fill half of the training slots.99 Likewise, a seniority override
would not necessarily bar advancement of all white employees because
even though some white employees would be laid off, others would re-
main who could continue to work for and advance in the company.1o
Second, Kaiser's training plan did not require that any whites be
discharged and replaced with new black employees. 101 Similarly, sen-
iority overrides do not require the replacement of discharged white
workers with new black workers. 0 2 Without the word "new," it might
be difficult to distinguish between discharging a white employee and
replacing him or her with a new black employee, and discharging a
white employee in favor of keeping a less senior black employee. The
Weber Court's specific reference to "new" employees suggests that the
Court did not intend to bar retention of current minority employees.
Therefore, this element of the guideline does not preclude seniority
overrides.
The third factor considered by the Weber Court was that the pro-
gram was temporary; it was not "intended to maintain racial balance
but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance."'0 3 The plan
would end when the percentage of skilled black craftworkers approxi-
mated the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.' °4
Seniority overrides are also a temporary remedy if they are used
only until the goal of a representative workforce is achieved. Seniority
overrides are not generally used to maintain racial balance, in the sense
of preserving an already racially balanced workforce, but rather are
98. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
99. Id.
100. Neither the Tangren court nor the Sisco court addressed this particular factor. In
the following hypothetical approximately 7.7% of the white workers would be affected by a
seniority override: Assume Company X employs 100 workers, 10% (10) of whom are black
and 90% (90) of whom are white. If Company X must lay off 30 employees, and in the last
five years the Company has hired 10 black and 20 white workers, then on the basis of strict
seniority, 100% of the black employees would be laid off and approximately 22% of the
white employees would be laid off (10/10 and 20/90, respectively). With a seniority over-
ride, 33% of the blacks (3) and 33% of the whites (27) would be laid off, thus retaining a 10%
(7) black workforce out of the remaining 70 employees. An additional 7 white workers
(7/90 or 7.7%) are affected by the seniority override.
101. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
102. The Tangren district court disposed of this issue by stating that layoffs required
consideration only of which employees are released, not the identity of the replacements.
Tangren, 480 F. Supp. at 549. The Sisco court simply noted that Sisco was not replaced with
a black employee. Tangren, 655 F.2d at 149.
103. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
104. Id. at 208-09.
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used to protect whatever progress has been made in an ongoing effort
to racially integrate the workforce. Thus, to the extent a seniority over-
ride policy serves only as a kind of stop-gap affirmative action policy
until racial imbalance is eliminated, it is a temporary program in the
Weber sense. The district court in Tangren took a different approach,
finding that the seniority override contract provision was temporary be-
cause it was subject to renegotiation every three years. 0 5
Balancing the Interests of White Workers with the Goals of
Title VII
In addition to the three factors discussed above, the issue of
whether the seniority override program unnecessarily trammels the in-
terests of white workers inevitably calls for a general balancing of the
interests of white workers with society's interest in achieving the goals
of title VII. 10 6
The Interests of White Workers
The courts have made it clear that white employees must share in
the burden of alleviating discrimination, 10 7 and that the public interest
in affirmative action hiring and promotion plans generally outweighs
the adverse effects on white workers.108 As one court observed, "if re-
lief under title VII can be denied merely because the majority group of
employees, who have not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy
about it, there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the
Act is directed."' 0 9
It has been argued, however, that seniority overrides burden white
employees more heavily than do hiring and promotion affirmative ac-
tion programs.'l 0 This argument suggests that the balance should shift
105. Tangren, 480 F. Supp. at 549.
106. In Weber the Court did not explicitly balance the competing interests involved.
However, a balancing approach is implicit in the phrase "unnecessarily trammel," which
suggests a concern that affirmative action does not cause more harm to white workers than
necessary to achieve title VII objectives. It is not unusual for courts to use a balancing
approach in evaluating the competing interests of affirmative action and white workers. See
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 560 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451
(1983) ("A consent decree ... is the preferred means of balancing societal and individual
interests inherent in any employment discrimination action."); Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451
F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1972).
107. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976) ("the result which we
reach today ... establishes that a sharing of the burden of the past discrimination is pre-
sumptively necessary"). See also Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980).
108. Although not always explicitly stated, this is the clear implication of cases ordering
or upholding affirmative action remedies. See supra cases cited at notes 6, 10.
109. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971).
110. See, e.g., Blumrosen, Affirnative Action in Employment After Weber, 34 RUTGERS
L. Rnv. 1, 21 (1981).
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in favor of white employees. The burden of losing a secured job may
be more severe than the burden of losing a job opportunity. Not only
may the psychological impact be less at the hiring stage, when expecta-
tions are less "solidly grounded,"I' but layoffs may bring with them all
the attendant evils of unemployment, including loss of economic secur-
ity and self esteem. Of course, similar hardships may result when an
employment opportunity is denied or deferred due to use of affirmative
action in hiring decisions. Yet to the extent that losing a job causes a
greater psychological impact than losing a job opportunity, seniority
overrides are a harsher remedy than an affirmative action hiring plan.
Yet the relative impact of the remedy is not by itself sufficient to
determine its reasonableness under the Weber balancing test. An as-
sessment of the reasonableness of the burdens created by seniority
overrides depends largely upon how one views the role of white work-
ers. If the white employee is viewed as being "innocently sacrificed"
for the wrongs of the employer 12 or society, then the consequences of
losing a job seem that much harsher. However, if white employees are
viewed as present beneficiaries of a job market artificially fixed to their
advantage, then seniority overrides become a more moderate and equi-
table burden. Under the latter view, seniority overrides can be thought
of as redistributing seniority rights to more accurately reflect what they
would have been absent prior discrimination.
At least two courts have adopted this "unearned advantage" view-
point. In Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department,"l3 the court rejected the
argument that the seniority override would "unduly interfere" with
11l. One study suggests that in the "hierarchy" of needs, job security comes directly
after the basic necessities of life. See Wines, Seniority, Recession, and 4lirmative Action.-
The Challenge/or Collective Bargaining, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 37, 43 (1982) (citing A. MASLOW,
MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954)).
112. This viewpoint is expressed in Fischer, Seniority is Healthy, 27 LAB. L.J. 497 (1976).
"The notion that white workers should be victimized by destroying their bona fide seniority
rights to continued employment because of past discriminatory hiring patterns imposed by
management punishes the innocent, not the guilty." Id. at 502. The response to this argu-
ment is that it is inconsistent to consider it "unfair" for innocent whites to bear part of the
burden for past discrimination when it comes to layoffs, but not for innocent minority work-
ers to bear the entire burden of this discrimination. As Judge Wright has noted:
In a society where racial discrimination has been so pervasive, most white persons
have both contributed to and benefited from discrimination to some degree ...
To place the blame generally on social institutions relieves us all individually of
responsibility.... [A] nonperpetrator who has been unjustly enriched in an as-
certainable way by discrimination may have to contribute to remedying the injury
from such discrimination.
Wright, supra note 3, at 240 n.92. It has also been suggested that the guilty employer, rather
than either the white or black employee, should bear the burden. See Elkiss, Modifying
Seniority Systems Which Perpetuate Past Discrimination, 31 LAB L.J. 37, 42-44 (1980);
Wines, supra note 111, at 56.
113. 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983).
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white employee expectations concerning promotions. It appeared to
the court that "the expectation of non-minorities is based upon a pre-
decree minority promotion ratio which presumptively would have been
significantly higher had the City's employment practices been non-dis-
criminatory."114 The court found that "[n]on-minorities benefited from,
practiced, and acquiesced in those practices. The 1980 decree is a rea-
sonable means to correct the adverse effects which minorities
shouldered as a result of those [discriminatory] employment
practices."115
In Baker v. City of Detroit,116 the court found that white police
officers had significantly benefited from prior discriminatory prac-
tices. 117 When these officers alleged that an affirmative action promo-
tion program interfered with their seniority expectations, the court
upheld the plan, recognizing that "[i]t is true that affirmative action
upsets the expectations of white workers, but such expectations are in-
deed tainted when they are based on a legacy of discrimination."' 118
Thus, white employees may be "innocent" in the sense that they
did not personally institute discriminatory practices, but the seniority
they have accumulated may not be "innocent" of the benefits of dis-
crimination. Courts do not weigh the seniority expectations of white
workers as if they were accumulated in a neutral fashion, but rather
recognize when they in part represent the benefits of historical discrimi-
nation gained at the expense of minority workers.
Finally, it should be noted that if a union has agreed to a seniority
override provision, it would be more difficult for its members to argue
that their interests have been unnecessarily trammeled. Because sen-
iority rights are economic rather than vested rights, they can be bar-
gained away." 9 Thus a union-approved plan preserves the white
employees' bargaining rights.' 20
114. Id. at 556.
115. Id. at 559. See also Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 1003 (2d Cir.
1976) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
116. 483 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Mich. 1979), a~fd, 704 F.2d 878 (1983).
117. Id. at 940-58, 1002.
118. Id. at 1002. See also Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Delivery Union, 514 F.2d
767, 775 (2d Cir. 1975) ("To the extent that the ... [affirmative action program] may cause
a temporary decline in. .. [a] white worker's rate of promotion. . . , it merely compensates
for past discrimination by allowing a reasonable number of minority persons to be promoted
to the 'rightful place' on the seniority ladder, which they would have occupied, but for in-
dustry-wide racial discrimination.").
119. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953); Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs. Inc., 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
120. The Supreme Court has alluded to the legitimacy of a security override provision
in a collective bargaining agreement by noting that "the ability of the union and employer
voluntarily to modify the seniority system to the end of ameliorating the effects of past dis-
crimination [is a] national policy objective of the 'highest priority."' Franks v. Bowman
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The Goals of Title VII
On the other side of the scale from the interests of white workers
lie the goals of title VII. For Congress, title VII symbolized the "vindi-
cation of a major public interest."' 2 1 Congress' intent was to close the
earnings and employment gap between white and black workers 22 and
integrate blacks into the mainstream of society.' 23 Eradication of em-
ployment discrimination, however, requires more than mere legal
prohibitions against discrimination; affirmative action is a necessary
supplement. 24 enactment of affirmative action remedial measures for
title VII violations 2 5 reflects this belief.
Voluntary seniority overrides in the private sector can play a criti-
cal role in achieving the goals embodied in title VII. If a hiring and
promotion affirmative action program is already in place, the failure to
extend affirmative action principles to layoffs will often eradicate any
progress that has been achieved. 126 Seniority overrides are particularly
important in light of the regularity with which economic downturns
occur. Since 1854, when the government first began compiling such
records, there have been twenty-nine recessions, averaging one every
four and one-half years. 27 If with every downturn minority employ-
ment gains are largely undermined, integration of minorities into the
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779 (1976). See also American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456
U.S. 63, 71 n.5 (1982). Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952) (although
plaintiff employees would not have been laid off but for a collective bargaining provision
requiring the employer to give preference to veterans, the Supreme Court sustained the
provision).
121. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 CoNG. REC.
7166, 7168 (1972) (section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1746).
122. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 4-8 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
123. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202.
124. See supra note 3; see also United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d
918, 943-45 (10th Cir. 1979) (as a practical matter, "[w]hen a practice [of discrimination has]
• ..become a way of life for the company, there is little basis for assuming that the com-
pany is going to get religion, so to speak, overnight. .. .[Adoption of an affirmative action
plan] is a practical measure which would prevent possible repetition of [this] long and ardu-
ous lawsuit"); Associate Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974) ("[t]he observation that the Constitution is colorblind rep-
resents a long-term goal, and it is by now understood that our society cannot be completely
colorblind in the short term if we are to have a colorblind society in the long term"); Baker
v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 1001 (1979) ("until our society progresses further, af-
firmative action will remain a necessity").
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
126. See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 561 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983) ("It is uncontroverted that the application of the layoff policy...
would have virtually destroyed the progress belatedly achieved through affirmative ac-
tion."); Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 1981) (seniority based layoffs can make a
"mockery of hiring goals").
127. See Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
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economic mainstream will become that much more difficult. 28 In-
deed, without seniority overrides title VII will be effectively limited to
its colorblind provisions. Considering the extent of discriminatory em-
ployment practices and the frequency of economic recessions, such a
limitation may prove fatal to the goals of title VII.
Because the competing interests of white workers and employment
equality cannot be quantified precisely, the balancing of these interests
ultimately rests upon individual judicial judgments. Two courts have
already made this difficult decision in favor of seniority overrides. 2 9 In
one of these cases, Tangren,130 the district court concluded that "the
interests of non-minority employees are not 'unnecessarily trammeled'
by the seniority overrides in favor of minority employees. The rela-
tively minor infringement upon the seniority expectations of white em-
ployees is outweighed by the benefits to be achieved through
affirmative action to insure minority representation in WSI's
workforce." 131
Although one might object to the description of the infringement as
"minor," the congressional goal of eradicating employment discrimina-
tion requires that this burden be borne. The fortunes of individual em-
ployees are outweighed by the social value of achieving equality in the
workplace.
Conclusion
Seniority overrides should survive judicial scrutiny as a permissi-
ble form of affirmative action in the private sector. The legislative his-
tory and judicial interpretations of section 703(h) of title VII make
128. One statistical study showed that in recessionary periods minorities are generally
laid off first and rehired last when economic recovery begins. J. Malveaux, Unemployment
Differentials By Race and Occupation (unpublished dissertation, Mass. Inst. Technology,
1980). For example, during the 1973-1975 recession, minorities lost their jobs 1.44 times
faster than whites. During the 1975-1980 recovery period, however, minorities returned to
work only .89 times as fast as whites. In the 1980-1981 recovery period, the recovery rate in
the minority labor force was so sluggish that minorities were losing their jobs 1.4 times faster
than whites were obtaining jobs. The only exception was the 1961-1969 recovery period. In
the preceding recession (1960-1961) minorities left the work force at a rate of 1.88 times
faster than whites. When the economy recovered, they returned to work 2.23 times faster
than whites. See Appendix.
129. Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs. Inc., 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 916 (1982); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 976 (1982).
130. Tangren v. Wackenlut Servs. Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979), aff'd, 658 F.2d
705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
131. Id. at 550. See also Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 560 (6th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983) ("This realignment [resulting from the seniority over-
ride] vindicates a societal interest in remedying the effects of racial [discrimination] and
more than justifies the displeasure some non-minorities may experience.").
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clear that the section only provides that bona fide seniority systems are
legal under title VII. The section does not prohibit private sector em-
ployers from voluntarily modifying seniority systems to achieve title
VII goals.
An analysis of Weber suggests that seniority overrides satisfy its
guidelines for permissible voluntary affirmative action programs in the
private sector. Like other types of affirmative action, seniority over-
rides mirror the purposes of title VII by breaking down traditionally
segregated job categories, thus satisfying the first guideline. The sec-
ond guideline, that the interests of white workers should not be "unnec-
essarily trammeled" presents the most difficult challenge. It ultimately
requires a balancing of the competing interests of white workers in us-
ing their seniority to keep their jobs and the interests of society in
achieving title VII goals.
A weighing of these interests shows the scale tipped in favor of
seniority overrides. Because recessions and attendant layoffs are fre-
quent, extension of affirmative action principles to layoffs is critical to
maintaining the effectiveness of hiring and promotional programs, and
therefore is essential to the achievement of a racially integrated
workforce. Colorblind laws alone are not enough to make substantial
inroads against such an intractable foe as employment discrimination.
It is during periods of economic recession that insecurities, disap-
pointments, and self interest mount. Yet these concerns should not be-
come an excuse for abandoning a national priority. America's
commitment to title VII goals should not be just a fairweather friend,
lauded in times of prosperity but shunned in more difficult times. Vol-
untary seniority overrides in the private sector are an equitable way for
employers to continue to work, during adverse economic times, toward
the fulfillment of title VII's goals.
Karen G. Kramer*
* Member, Third Year Class.
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